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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Petitioner appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief.

Petitioner asserts that the district court has

essentially made a class of claims effectively unreviewable. This is
because the court held as to some (unobjected to) claims, that they were
forfeited because they could have been brought on appeal but were not,
while at the same time holding that

there is no claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel for failure to raise an issue on appeal as
fundamental error.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Idaho Court of Appeals in its unpublished opinion from the
direct appeal, State v. Roberts, docket 42535 (Idaho Ct. Appeals
9/17/2015 unpublished) explained the facts as follows:
Based upon evidence submitted at trial, on September 1,
2012, at 4:11 a.m., the Boise City Fire Department responded
to a report of a fire at a residence and firefighters were on
scene within three to four minutes. Boise firefighters
extinguished the fire located on a patio in the back of the
house and observed several canisters near the fire’s origin
that smelled of gasoline.
A fire investigator observed a broken window near the fire
damage, which appeared to have been broken from outside
the residence. The investigator also observed canisters
containing gasoline placed around a flower pot with one of
the canister’s nozzles placed directly into the pot. The valve
of a fire-damaged propane tank attached to a barbeque grill
on the patio was turned to the “on” position. Based on these
observations, the fire investigator concluded that an ignitable
liquid was poured onto a part of the patio and the fire was
intentionally set, but that the fire largely burned itself out
1

before it reached the interior of the house. He testified that
the fire burned for approximately six to eight minutes before it
was extinguished.
Boise police investigators found blood stains around the
broken window. Several samples of the stains were collected
and sent to the Idaho State Lab for testing, which
presumptively matched the DNA of Steven Roberts. The
officers then obtained a DNA sample from Roberts, which
confirmed his DNA at the scene of the fire. Roberts was
charged with one count of arson in the first degree, Idaho
Code § 18-802; burglary, I.C. § 18-1401; and a persistent
violator enhancement, I.C. § 19-2514. Roberts waived his
right to a jury trial and requested a bench trial.
At trial, Roberts testified in his own defense. He testified that
on the night in question, he took his girlfriend’s car without
her permission and met up with his friend, J.M., at a bar. After
meeting up with J.M., he went to the residence in question
with a woman he had met earlier that night and who told him
the house was haunted. He testified that something
frightened him while he was there so he ran, tripped, and fell
through the window on the back porch, cutting his arm. He
then returned to the bar to meet up with J.M. Roberts denied
setting a fire or touching any gasoline cans while at the
residence.
J.M. also testified at trial, stating that Roberts left the bar
several times during the evening, including a couple of hours
before closing time. He testified that Roberts last returned to
the bar a few minutes before closing, around the time that
everyone was leaving, and that the business closes at 4:00
a.m. He also testified that Roberts smelled of gasoline and
had a cut on his arm. When asked, Roberts told him he had
been in a fight. Roberts’ girlfriend testified that he told her he
cut his arm by falling against a dumpster.
The district court found Roberts guilty of burglary and arson in
the first degree. Roberts then admitted to being a persistent
violator. The district court imposed a unified thirty-year
sentence with ten years determinate for arson in the first
degree, and a concurrent unified ten year sentence with five
years determinate for burglary.
State v. Roberts, p. 1-2 (footnote omitted).
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The court’s Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for
Summary Dismissal (hereinafter Decision)

continues to explain the

procedure:
Roberts appealed his arson conviction on grounds that the
State presented insufficient evidence in support, namely, he
relied on the time estimates provided by the responding
firefighter, who opined that the fire was set between 4:07
and 4:11 a.m., and that provided by Jesse, who testified that
Roberts re-appeared at the bar around 3:55 a.m. Thus,
Roberts argued he could not have been present when the
fire was started. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction, noting that the "minimal discrepancy in the
witnesses' estimate is not so significant as to nullify the
State's evidence of Roberts' guilt in light of the other
evidence against him (i.e., being on the property and
smelling of gasoline)." 2015 WL 5511096, *2.
Decision, p. 3. (R. p. 171.)
Thereafter, Mr. Roberts filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction
relief with affidavits in support.

(R. p. 5-19.)

At his request, counsel was

appointed, but no amended petition was filed. (R. p. 169.) Mr. Roberts did file an
additional pro-se affidavit in support which clarified, amended, and withdrew
some of his claims. The state filed a motion for summary disposition, and a
hearing was held. (R. p. 169.)
The court granted the state’s motion and summarily dismissed the petition
in a written decision. (R. p. 169-188.) A separate judgment was filed. (R. p. 189190.)
Appellant timely appeals. (R. p. 191-193.)
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ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUMMARILY DENIED THE
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF PETITION BECAUSE THE EFFECT OF
ITS RULINGS MAKE CERTAIN CLAIMS UNREVIEWABLE
A.

Standard of Review at Trial and on Appeal
An application for post-conviction relief under Idaho Code § 19-

4901 is civil in nature and is an entirely new proceeding distinct from the
criminal action which led to the conviction. Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho
494 (Ct.App. 1994).

In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding,

the applicant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. Id.
Summary disposition is the procedural equivalent of summary
judgment under I.R.C.P. 56, with the facts construed and all reasonable
inferences made in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759 (Ct.App. 1991).

Allegations contained

in the verified petition are deemed true for the purpose of determining
whether an evidentiary hearing should be held. Martinez v. State, 125
Idaho 844 (Ct.App. 1994).

If the allegations do not frame a genuine

issue of material fact, the court may grant a motion to summarily dismiss,
but if the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must
conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id.
In determining whether a motion for summary disposition was
properly granted, the appellate court reviews the facts in the light most

4

favorable to petitioner and determines whether, if true, they would entitle
petitioner to relief. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319 (1995).
B.

Standard of Review Regarding a Claim of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel
The standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel is well established, being set forth in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984).

The "benchmark for judging any claim of

ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied
on as having produced a just result." Id. at 686.
Strickland set forth a two-prong test which a defendant must satisfy
in order to be entitled to relief. The defendant must demonstrate both that
his

counsel's

performance

fell

below

an

objective

standard

of

reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.
Id. at 687-88; State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129 (1989); Gibson v.
State, 110 Idaho 631 (1986).
More specifically as to allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel based on tactical decisions, the Court of Appeals explained in
Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396 (Ct. App. 2013):
This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tacticalor
strategic decisions of counsel will not be second-guessed on
appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings
capable of objective evaluation. There is a strong
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presumption that counsel's performance fell within the wide
range of professional assistance.
Id., p. 385-386 (internal citations omitted).
C.

The Claims and the Court’s Rulings
Petitioner made many claims, but only a few are at issue in this

appeal. They involve claims that the court summarily dismissed because
they could have been, but were not, raised on direct appeal.

The court’s

Memorandum Decision dismissed them as follows:
A. Judicial Misconduct
1. Improper Inferences
Roberts contends that [the] Court improperly relied on its
own scientific assumptions in rejecting Roberts' story that he
broke the window by tripping and falling through it. Namely,
the Court stated at sentencing:
[F]rankly I found your testimony ... pushing the limits
of physical impossibility. Given where the window was
broken at, the thickness of the window, how much
running speed you could have gotten up to in those
few feet from your chair to where your window was,
you would have almost to have jumped on a
trampoline and had a helmet on and tried to go
through the window like a spear at a level well above
what you would be at just running. It was clear that
the physics of where the window was broken, how
thick it was, the fact that you claim you broke the
window by running and tripping headfirst into the
window, I don't find that credible. I don't find it frankly
practicable to have happened that way at all.
Tr., p. 693:8-23.
Roberts contends that there was no evidence presented at
trial through which the Court could reasonably make this
inference. Namely, there was nothing presented regarding
the thickness of the window, Roberts' body weight, the
speed required to break the window, or supporting the idea
that the location of the break was incompatible with the law
6

of physics. Robert argues that this evidence is the type of
“scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" that
must be presented by an expert, not simply assumed.
The State argues the claim is barred as forfeited since it
could have been raised upon direct appeal. Bias v. State,
159 Idaho 696, 702, 365 P.3d 1050, 1056-67 (Ct. App. 20
15). Roberts acknowledges that this is the general rule, but
points out that there is an exception to this rule where "the
asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the
reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise
of due diligence, have been presented earlier." ld. Roberts
contends that his claim falls under this exception because he
was not aware of the Court's reliance on its own
assumptions until sentencing. However while this may have
precluded Roberts from objecting at trial, it in no way
precluded him from being able to raise the issue on direct
appeal. He filed the appeal after the sentencing hearing and,
therefore, could have raised it. Consequently, the claim is
summarily dismissed.
2. Denial of Right to Present Defense
Roberts also argues the Court erred by denying Roberts the
opportunity to call an expert witness regarding how the
window was broken and provide opinion that Roberts' body
could not have broken the window. Along this same vein,
Roberts further complains that the Court asked clarifying
questions of State's witnesses regarding how the window
broke, but did not ask similar questions of Roberts. Had the
Court asked, Robert contends he could have responded to
the Court's concerns.
Again, the State correctly argues that the claim is barred
because it could have been raised on direct appeal. Bias.
supra. Roberts has offered no reason why, in the exercise of
due diligence, it could not have been raised at the time of
appeal. Thus, it is summarily dismissed.
3. Prosecutorial Misconduct 6
------------------Some of the photos disclosed by the State prior to trial
included those from a prior murder/arson investigation at the
Randolph Property. Roberts contends that the prosecutor's
failure to identify prior to trial which photos would be used at
trial prohibited Roberts' counsel from calling an expert
witness and mounting an affirmative defense.

7

The State correctly argues that the claim is barred as
forfeited since it could have been raised upon direct appeal.
Bias. supra. Roberts has not established why the claim could
not have been raised earlier; indeed, he does not address
the State's argument at all. Consequently, it is summarily
dismissed. 7
Footnotes
6 A second basis asserted by Roberts for
“prosecutorial misconduct" was the prosecutor's act
of ''vouching'' for Jesse McPhie's credibility at trial,
despite the fact that Jesse had given conflicting
testimony at the preliminary hearing. Roberts
subsequently withdrew this claim.
7 In addition, while the Court does not rely on this
ground for dismissal, there is no duty on the part of
the prosecutor to reveal sequence of prosecution; if
items were discovered, then defense has all notice it
needs to defend against charges.
Decision, p. 5-6. (R. p. 173-174.)
Relevant to these claims are the court’s rulings regarding appellate
claims:
4. Appellate Errors
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court commented on the duty
of appellate counsel to criminal defendants, noting:
Appellate counsel is not required to raise every issue
available to the defendant. This Court has recognized
the United States Supreme Court precedent that
appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty
to raise every non-frivolous issue requested by
defendant. Rather, to demonstrate deficient
performance of appellate counsel for failure to raise a
claim on appeal, the defendant must show that
counsel made an objectively unreasonable decision to
omit the claim. Accordingly, appellate counsel is not
deficient merely for omitting an argument as the
weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as
one of the hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy.
When reviewing appellate counsel's performance, we
determine whether, but for appellate counsel's errors,
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a reasonable probability exists that the defendant
would have prevailed on appeal.
Crawford v. State, 160 Idaho 586, 377 P.3d 400, 411 (2016),
internal quotes and cites omitted.
In addition, the Court has noted:
Indeed, it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was
incompetent based on failure to raise a particular
claim on appeal. Only when ignored issues are clearly
stronger than those presented will the strong
presumption of effective assistance of counsel be
overcome.
Heilman v. State, 158 Idaho 139, 146, 344 P.3d 919, 926
(Ct. App. 2015), internal cites omitted.
Decision, p. 16 (R. p. 184.)
Later in the Decision the court stated:
b. Failure to raise issue of judicial abuse of discretion
Roberts contends his appellate counsel failed to challenge
the Court's abuse of discretion by relying on its own
application of subjective scientific standards to reject
Roberts' account of his fall through the window. He contends
that, even though his trial counsel did not object to the
Court's statements, appellate counsel could have raised this
issue as fundamental error. The State contends that Roberts
may not raise this claim against appellate counsel. The State
is correct.
ln Mintun v. State, the Court of Appeals rejected the attempt
by the petitioner to assert an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim against appellate counsel tor failure to raise a
"fundamental error'' on appeal. 144 Idaho 656, 662, 168
P.3d 40, 46 (Ct. App. 2007). The Court cited to four reasons
for this decision. First, a rule deeming appellate counsel
ineffective for failing to raise an issue of fundamental error
would force appellate attorneys to raise on appeal nearly all
possible errors, whether preserved by objection in the trial
court or not, to avoid the risk of being declared ineffective.
Id. Second, it is often not to a criminal defendant's
advantage to raise an issue of fundamental error on direct
appeal because the record in the criminal proceeding may
not be adequately developed for a full presentation of the
9

defendant's claim. Id. Third, a trial attorney's failure to object
to inadmissible evidence or other potential errors may be
done for legitimate strategic or tactical purpose, and the
record on appeal would rarely show this strategy. ld. Fourth,
allowing such a claim against appellate counsel is
unnecessary to protect a defendant's rights because the
defendant can bring the same claim of impropriety in the trial
proceedings as a claim of ineffective assistance of his trial
counsel for failing to object to the alleged error in the trial
court. Id.
Under Mintun, Roberts' claim against appellate counsel for
failure to raise judicial abuse of discretion cannot proceed.
The claim is dismissed.
Decision, p. 17-18. (R. p. 185-186.)
D.

The Court’s Rulings Create a Class of Claims Unable to be
Reviewed and are, Therefore, Erroneous
The court has created a class of claimed error that is essentially

unreviewable. First, the court held that various errors are forfeited by the
failure to raise them on appeal. Then, the court’s rulings on ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel show that it is for all practical purposes
non-existent.

The combination of these two things whipsaws the

petitioner, his claims are dismissed because they were not raised on
appeal by appellate counsel, but he cannot challenge appellate counsel’s
failure to raise claims on appeal.
To further explain using the claim of judicial misconduct as an
example, the court again ruled as follows:
. . . Roberts contends that his claim falls under this
exception because he was not aware of the Court's
reliance on its own assumptions until sentencing.
However while this may have precluded Roberts from
objecting at trial, it in no way precluded him from being
10

able to raise the issue on direct appeal. He filed the
appeal after the sentencing hearing and, therefore, could
have raised it.
Decision, p. 5-6 (emphasis in the original). (R. p. 173-174.)
So the court acknowledges that the error was not objected to in the
trial court. Thus, it would have to be raised as fundamental error. But
then, as to the claim that appellate counsel failed to raise the judicial
misconduct as fundamental error, the court holds:
He contends that, even though his trial counsel did not
object to the Court's statements, appellate counsel could
have raised this issue as fundamental error. The State
contends that Roberts may not raise this claim against
appellate counsel. The State is correct.
Decision at p. 17. (R. p. 185.)
The same is true for the claims that Petitioner was deprived of the
right to present a defense and prosecutorial misconduct. The court ruled
they could have been brought on direct appeal and so dismissed them.
However, they were not objected to and so appellate counsel’s failure to
raise them as fundamental error is not reviewable.1
Further, even if the errors were objected to, as the district court
explains, it is still exceptionally difficult to establish ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel for failure to raise an issue on appeal. This is
because it requires a showing that the omitted issue was clearly stronger
than those raised.

As an aside, it seems doubtful that these claims could have been
brought on the direct appeal record.
1
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Thus, the combination of the rulings is that for all practical purposes
claims that could have been brought on direct appeal but were not cannot
be brought in a post-conviction because they are forfeited, and then
appellate counsel’s failure to bring those claims cannot be reviewed, either
expressly for unobjected

to claims and for all practical purposes for

preserved claims. Thus, the court has created an entire class of claims
that are not subject to review and has therefore erred.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above, Appellant/Petitioner
respectfully requests that the district court’s order summarily dismissing
his petition for post-conviction relief be reversed and remanded to the
district court.
DATED this 11th day of September, 2017.
/s/ Greg S. Silvey
Greg S. Silvey
Attorney for Appellant
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